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Article 3

Responding to Political Corruption: Some
Institutional Considerations
JonathanL. Entin*

Earlier this year, New York Times columnist Gail Collins asked which
state has the most corrupt political culture. As one might expect, she
focused on the Empire State, where the governor who was elected in
2006 was forced from office in a sex scandal, his successor is under
several ethical clouds, and a state senator who was briefly involved in
an abortive coup against his party's leadership was expelled from the
legislature after being convicted of domestic assault.1 In the end,
though, she gave the nod to Illinois, where the governor elected in 2006
was impeached and removed from office for misconduct and is now
facing a retrial for allegedly trying to auction President Obama's former
U.S. Senate seat to the highest bidder, among other charges, and the
Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor withdrew amid personal
Many readers suggested that other states deserved
scandals. 2
consideration for this questionable honor.3
As a native Bostonian, I would like to nominate Massachusetts for
consideration. My home state has the dubious distinction of having
three consecutive Speakers of the House of Representatives indicted for
felonies; two later pleaded guilty, while the third case is still pending (a
fourth was indicted in 1964 but died before the case was resolved).4
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. Thanks to Brian
Gran for helpful suggestions and to Judith Kaul and Lisa Peters for help in locating fugitive
sources.
1. Gail Collins, The Biggest Losers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A33.
2. Id. This column focused on very recent developments. It did not mention some legendary
New York grafters such as Boss Tweed or Jimmy Walker, nor did it discuss former Illinois
Governor George Ryan or the scandal that led to the withdrawal of Barack Obama's original
Republican opponent for the U.S. Senate in 2004.
3. See Gail Collins, There's Always California, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010, at A23 (listing
readers' suggestions for the most politically corrupt state).
4.

Brian C. Mooney, Concentration of Power Held by Speaker Blamed as a Key Factor, BOS.

GLOBE, June 3, 2009, at 11. Of course, not all officials with criminal records are corrupt. See,
e.g., Calvin Trillin, U.S. Journal: Madison, Wisconsin-The Red Mayor and the Ideal Place,

NEW YORKER, Dec. 3, 1973, at 150, 152 (noting that the arrests of members of a city council in
connection with Vietnam War protests "might make the Eighth District of Madison the only
aldermanic district in the country in which two consecutive incumbents have been arrested on
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Several members of Congress from the Bay State have also been
convicted of corruption.5 In addition, Massachusetts has something of a
tradition of reelecting imprisoned incumbents: James Michael Curley
was returned to the Boston City Council by his constituents in 1904
while serving a jail sentence for taking a civil service examination on
behalf of a constituent; 6 more than half a century later a state
representative was reelected while serving a prison sentence for less
altruistic misbehavior. 7 Then there is the Governor's Council, a curious
body with roots in the colonial era that serves as an advisor to and
occasional check on the governor8 : among its powers, this body must
approve the appointment of judges and a wide range of other officials,9
as well as various public contracts and other expenditures not
specifically authorized by the legislature. 10 At one point during my
youth, four of the eight members of the Governor's Council were either
in jail or under indictment, prompting my mother (who grew up in the
Bronx) to observe: "The difference between New York and
Massachusetts is that in New York the stealing is organized."'

charges that had nothing to do with stealing").
5.

See Martin F. Nolan, In Mass., Prison Doesn't Always Preclude One's Future in Politics,

Bos. GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1992, at 34 (listing members of Congress from Massachusetts who have
been reelected after a conviction on corruption charges).
6. THOMAS H. O'CONNOR, THE BOSTON IRISH: A POLITICAL HISTORY 181-82 (1995);
Charles H. Trout, Curley of Boston: The Searchfor Irish Legitimacy, in BOSTON 1700-1980: THE

EvOLUTION OF URBAN POLITICS 165, 175-76 (Ronald P. Formisano & Constance K. Bums eds.,
1984). Curley capped his political career in 1945 by winning his fourth term as mayor by a
record margin even though he was under indictment for mail fraud on election day. He was
imprisoned for several months during that term but was pardoned by President Harry Truman.
Although welcomed as a conquering hero on his return from the federal penitentiary in late 1947,
Curley was defeated for reelection in 1949. O'CONNOR, supra, at 209-12; Trout, supra, at 18889.
7. See Nolan, supra note 5, at 34 (noting that Rep. Charles lannello was reelected while
imprisoned for larceny).
8. MASS. CONST., pt. 2, ch. II, § II, art. I.
9. Id. § I, art. IX; see also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§ 26 (board of commissioners
on uniform state laws), 35 (state librarian), 70 (board of trustees of Holyoke soldiers' home), 97
(finance advisory board), 99 (boxers' fund board), 101 (obscene literature control commission)
(West 2006); id. ch. 13, §§ 39 (board of registration of barbers), 48 (board of registration of
dispensing opticians), 54 (board of registration of real estate brokers and salesmen) (West 2002);
id. ch. 22, § 11 (board of elevator regulations) (2002); id. ch. 23E, § 4 (industrial accident board)
(West 2002).
10. MASS. CONST., pt. 2, ch. I,§I, art. Xl.
11. One of my high school classmates discovered a loophole in the state election law that did
not require independent candidates for state office to be registered voters. He promptly
announced that he was running as an independent for the Governor's Council. The Secretary of
State, the chief election officer, persuaded him to drop his quixotic effort and arranged to have the
loophole closed by an embarrassed legislature.
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This less-than-serious debate over the least honest political culture
does have a serious point. The existence of corruption confirms
Madison's observation: "If men were angels, no government would be
necessary."l 2 Of course, if men (and women) are not angels, those who
hold governmental authority are not angels, either. Madison focused on
institutional structures that would "enable the government to control the
governed" while also "oblig[ing] it to control itself."13 One important
way to get the government to control itself is to address the problem of
corruption.
This paper focuses on corruption involving higher-level officials. Of
course, corruption can occur at every level of government and at every
rank of officialdom. But the corrosive effect of corruption at the top
As Justice Brandeis explained, "If the
raises special concern.
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."l4 We can
address this sort of corruption ex ante and ex post: through institutional
mechanisms that are designed to prevent corruption in the first place,
and through mechanisms designed to prosecute and punish corruption
after it has already occurred. Neither prevention nor prosecution has
completely succeeded in eradicating political corruption. The following
discussion will examine and suggest the limitations of some institutional
arrangements that have been developed to prevent and prosecute
corruption. The paper concludes by asking whether corruption, at least
in moderation, might actually serve some socially useful function.
I. PREVENTION

Among the institutional measures that have been proposed to prevent
corruption are open meeting laws and term limits. This section will
address each of these approaches in turn.
A. Open Meeting Laws

Open meeting laws are designed to compel the government to make
most decisions in public. Such laws exist at the federal level and in
almost every state. 15 Justice Brandeis offered a pithy justification for
12.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

13.

Id.

14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
15. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11120-11132 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 286.011-0115 (West 2009); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/17.5 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11 A 1/2 (West 2001); N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 100-i 1 (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22
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this approach: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman."' 6 The notion of open
meetings promotes two complementary constitutional values: it
encourages elected officials to act in the public interest rather than for
their own private gain, and by permitting the citizenry at large to
participate in the political process, it reduces the risk that factions will
gain excessive influence over public policy.1 7
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the extent to which
the Constitution might create a presumption of open legislative and
executive sessions, it has recognized that the First Amendment provides
a qualified right of public access to judicial proceedings.' 8 The Court's
reasoning in the cases involving judicial proceedings reflects many of
the justifications advanced by proponents of open meeting laws.1 9 First,
openness promotes the appearance of fairness and enhances public
confidence in the integrity of official proceedings. 20 As Chief Justice
Burger explained, "People in an open society do not demand infallibility
from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are
prohibited from observing." 21
Second, public access can educate the citizenry in the workings of
government, which in turn facilitates informed political discussion and
debate.22 Open meetings in which officials address difficult issues of
public policy can enlighten the public on the conflicting values and
intractable trade-offs that affect the resolution of many problems, which
(West Supp. 2009); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 551.001-128 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.30.010-920 (West 2006).
16. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 89
(Melvin I.Urofsky ed., Bedford Books 1995) (1914).
17.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 892

(1986) (describing a Jeffersonian conception of the purposes of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of expression).
18. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (access to
preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enter. 1), 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984)
(access to voir dire of prospective jurors in criminal trials); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct.,
457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (access to testimony of juvenile victim of sex crime); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (access to criminal trials).
19. For an argument that a First Amendment presumption of openness should apply to
meetings of local governmental bodies, see generally R. James Assaf, Note, Mr. Smith Comes
Home: The Constitutional Presumption of Openness in Local Legislative Meetings, 40 CASE W.

RES. L. REv. 227 (1989).
20. Press-Enter. 11, 478 U.S. at 12-13; Press-Enter. 1, 464 U.S. at 508; Globe Newspaper, 457

U.S. at 606; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571; id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
21.

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572.

22. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383
(1979).
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can promote greater appreciation for the political skills needed to
promote effective governance. This in turn can stimulate more
knowledgeable public consideration of these issues and perhaps even
encourage individual citizens to come forward with constructive
suggestions.23
Third, openness serves as a check against incompetence, venality, or
bias. 24 This consideration explicitly reflects the framers' concerns with
faction as a principal evil to be addressed in any system of effective
government. 25
Whatever might be said for open meeting laws in principle, we
should recognize their limitations. To begin with, such laws do not
require all public business to take place in public session. All open
meeting laws contain exceptions. 26 In this sense, open meeting laws are
analogous to the constitutional right of public access to judicial
proceedings, which is not absolute but only qualified. In fact, it might
be more difficult to rebut the First Amendment presumption of access to
the courts than it is to close all or part of a session under an open
meeting law because many exemptions under open meeting laws are
categorical, whereas a court must satisfy a very demanding legal
standard to close all or part of a proceeding that is presumptively open
to the public. 27
23. See Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383 (discussing the possibility that in public trials,
previously unknown witnesses may come forward to testify). .
24. Press-Enter. 1, 464 U.S. at 508; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond

Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569; id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25.

See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 72-73, 75 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961) (noting that factions cannot be prevented without infringing on the people's liberties,
but that factions can be controlled through appropriate institutional arrangements).
26. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (2006) (listing exceptions to the open meeting policy); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 11122.5(c), 11126 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010) (allowing closed meetings to
consider the appointment, employment, evaluation, or dismissal of a public employee); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 286.0113 (West 2009) (providing that meetings involving security system plans
may be closed to the public); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/2(c) (West 2005) (providing a
number of exceptions to the requirement that all public bodies hold open meetings); N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW § 108 (McKinney 2008) (excluding from open meeting requirements judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, the deliberations of political committees, and matters made confidential by
state or federal law); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(D) (West Supp. 2009) (listing specific
subjects that are exempt from a general policy of open public meetings); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 551.071-088 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (providing exceptions to the general rule that a
public body may not consult with an attorney in private).
27. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enter. 1l), 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986)
(holding that a preliminary hearing may not be closed "unless specific, on the record findings are
made" showing "a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity" and "reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect" the
defendant's rights); Press-Enter.1,464 U.S. at 510 (finding that the right of public access to trials
may be defeated "only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to

260

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 42

Further, at least some provisions of open meeting laws might run
afoul of the First Amendment in that such laws regulate the content of
speech by government officials. Specifically, these laws forbid a
majority of a multi-member body from discussing public business
except in public sessions. Private communications violate open meeting
laws. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in Rangra v. Brown,28 held that a provision of the Texas Open
Meeting Act that authorized criminal sanctions for statutory violations 29
should be assessed under strict scrutiny because that provision was a
content-based regulation of official speech. 30 The full court set the case
for rehearing en banc, 31 but subsequently ordered it dismissed as moot
because the plaintiffs term in office had expired. 32
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the
constitutionality of open meeting laws, 33 several lower courts have held
that elected officials have First Amendment rights that afford them
constitutional protection in voting on public business. For example, in
Miller v. Town of Hull,34 the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed a ruling that a town council had violated the First
Amendment by removing members of the local redevelopment authority
in a dispute over a proposed housing project for the elderly. The court
had "no difficulty" in concluding that "the act of voting on public issues
by a member of a public agency" implicated the constitutional right to
freedom of speech, a conclusion buttressed by the fact that the members
of the redevelopment authority were elected as required by state law. 35

preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest"); Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 606-07 (holding that closure of courtroom during testimony of juvenile victim of sex
offense requires a showing that "the denial [of public access] is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest").
28. 566 F.3d 515 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 576 F.3d 531 (5th Cir.), dismissed as
moot, 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009).
29. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 551.144.
30. Rangra, 566 F.3d at 521.
31. Rangra, 576 F.3d at 532.
32. Rangra, 584 F.3d at 207; id. at 209 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
33. The Supreme Court has held that candidates for elective office have free speech rights.
See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that a rule
forbidding candidates for elected judicial offices from announcing their views on controversial
legal issues violated the First Amendment); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 (1966) (holding
that a state legislature could not exclude a newly elected representative from membership in the
legislature on the basis of the representative's prior criticisms of American foreign and military
policy).
34. 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1989).
35. Id. at 532.
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Similarly, in Clarke v. United States,36 the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that an official's
vote was "inherently expressive" and therefore protected by the First
Amendment. 37 Accordingly, the court invalidated a congressional rider
conditioning the annual federal appropriation for the District of
Columbia on the D.C. Council's exempting religious and religiously
affiliated educational institutions from a gay rights ordinance. 38 As in
Rangra, this dispute ultimately was mooted. The appropriations bill to
which the rider was attached expired at the end of the fiscal year, and
Congress preempted the issue by directly enacting an exemption to the
D.C. gay rights ordinance for religious and religiously affiliated
educational institutions. 39
Finally, in Wrzeski v. City of Madison,40 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin enjoined the enforcement
of a municipal ordinance prohibiting city council members who were
present at a meeting from abstaining on any vote. Under the ordinance,
a member who refused to vote "aye" or "no" was subject to censure
and, for a repeat offense, to a $100 fine.41 The court reasoned that this
ordinance compelled a member to speak when she did not want to do
so, and that the city was unlikely to demonstrate a compelling interest in
support of its requirement. 42 Because any proposal needed an absolute
majority to succeed, prohibiting abstentions would not prevent the
council from functioning. 43 Moreover, constituents who objected to a
representative's unwillingness to take a clear position could vote out the
vacillator at the next election. 44
To be sure, there are cases pointing in the other direction. For
instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
summarily rebuffed a First Amendment defense in United States v. City
of Yonkers.45 In Yonkers, members of the city council were held in
36. 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot en banc, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
37. Id. at 411, 413.
38. Id. at 417 (concluding that the rider was invalid "under any standard of First Amendment
review" (emphasis added)). The rider was enacted in response to a judicial ruling that the D.C.
gay rights ordinance applied to Georgetown University. Id. at 405.
39. Clarke, 915 F.2d at 700.
40. 558 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
41. Id. at 665.
42. Id. at 667-68.
43. Id. at 668 & n.4.
44. Id. at 668. Nor was the abstention ban saved by another ordinance that allowed members
of the council to explain the reasons for their vote. Id. at 669.
45. 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States,
493 U.S. 265 (1990).
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contempt for refusing to enact measures to remedy housing and school
segregation. 4 6 The Second Circuit concluded that any First Amendment
interest that the officials might have possessed in refusing to vote for
the remedial measures was overridden by the public interest in securing
compliance with judicial orders to correct the city's failure to comply
with the Constitution.47 The Supreme Court ultimately set aside the
contempt findings against the officials without reaching the First
Amendment issues, holding that the district court had abused its
discretion in finding the individual defendants in contempt; it sufficed
to impose harsh fines on the city for its failure to comply with the
remedial order.48
Similarly, an expansive reading of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Garcetti v. Ceballos49 might support the notion that elected officials
have no First Amendment rights in connection with their discussion of
public business. Garcetti held that "public employees [who] make
statements pursuant to their official duties . . . are not speaking as

citizens for First Amendment purposes" and so enjoy no constitutional
protections for their speech. 50 Applying this limited view of public
employee speech rights to elected officials (and high-level appointed
officials such as agency heads and commissioners) would obviate any
First Amendment concerns about open meeting laws, but it is far from
clear that these persons should be viewed as public employees. Elected
officials, in particular, are not mere employees, but rather exercise
political authority for which they are directly accountable to the
voters. 51
Assuming that the Rangra court was correct in concluding that at
least some open meeting laws raise First Amendment issues, let us
consider whether those provisions could withstand a constitutional
challenge. With no Supreme Court precedent directly on point, we
46. Id. at 451.
47.

Id. at 457.

48. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 280. The First Amendment issues in Yonkers were complicated by
the fact that the city had entered into a consent decree, which the city council explicitly approved,
that agreed to implement the remedial order. Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 448; LISA BELKIN, SHOW ME
A HERO: A TALE OF MURDER, SUICIDE, RACE, AND REDEMPTION 28-34 (1999).
49. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
50. Id. at 421.
51. See Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 523-26 (5th Cir.) (discussing Supreme Court cases
that address the protection of elected officials' free speech rights, and noting that the public has
the power to hire and fire elected officials), reh'g en banc granted, 576 F.3d 531 (5th Cir.),
dismissed as moot, 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009). For a detailed critique of the elected-official-asemployee theory, see Christopher J. Diehl, Note, Open Meetings and Closed Mouths: Elected

Officials' Free Speech Rights After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 61
2010).

CASE

W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming
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might turn to an analogous area of regulation of the political process:
campaign finance law. The interests served by open meeting lawspreventing officials from acting in their private interest and reducing the
risk of factional influence 52-are similar to the interests advanced in
support of campaign finance regulation.
In a line of cases beginning with Buckley v. Valeo,53 the Supreme
Court has found that "the prevention of corruption and the appearance
of corruption" constitute a compelling governmental interest. 54 The
Buckley Court held that this anti-corruption interest could justify
restrictions on the amount of individual political contributions, 55 but
this interest could not justify restrictions on independent expenditures. 56
The

recent

decision

in

Citizens

United v.

Federal Election

Commission57

appears to have narrowed the nature of the anticorruption interest that can support campaign finance regulations. The
majority opinion repeatedly emphasizes that only quid pro quo
corruption-political favors resulting from campaign money-can
justify campaign finance restrictions. 58 Citizens United therefore might
undermine a general anti-corruption rationale for open meeting laws.
Absent a fairly direct link between closed meetings and self-interested
decision-making, open meeting laws might impermissibly restrict the
speech of public officials by preventing them from communicating with
each other in private.
It is not clear, however, that the Rangra panel was correct in
concluding that open meeting laws should trigger strict scrutiny. After
all, open meeting laws are not viewpoint-based regulations. The
requirement of public discussion of official business applies across the
board, regardless of opinion or political affiliation. In other words,
open meeting laws do regulate the content of officials' speech, but they
do so in a viewpoint-neutral way. They are, in short, subject-matter
regulations. Because open meeting laws are not designed to distort
political debate or to favor one side of controversial public issuesindeed, they are meant to promote public discussion and political
accountability-perhaps they should be evaluated under a less
52. See supra text accompanying note 17 (explaining that open meetings promote the
constitutional values of encouraging elected officials to act in the public interest and permitting
citizens to participate in the political process).
53. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
54. Id. at 25-26.
55.

Id.

56. Id. at 47-48.
57. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
58. Id. at 908-10.
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demanding First Amendment standard. 59 The Supreme Court might
reject this suggestion, if its campaign finance jurisprudence is any
guide. After all, the prohibition on corporate expenditures in candidate
elections that was at the heart of the Citizens United decision was
viewpoint-neutral as well; the ban applied across the board and
prevented companies from spending their own funds to promote or
oppose candidates for public office. Although the regulation was based
on subject matter rather than viewpoint, the Court nevertheless
subjected it to strict scrutiny. 60
Entirely apart from whether open meeting laws can withstand a First
Amendment challenge, we should consider the effectiveness of such
measures in achieving their goals of preventing self-interested decision
making by public officials and enhancing citizens' engagement with
civic affairs. Assessments of open meeting laws have not specifically
addressed the extent to which those laws affect the incidence of
corruption, but they do suggest that mandatory public decision making
has costs as well as benefits. Although such laws have enhanced public
access to information, 61 they might have harmed the quality of decision
making. For example, commentators and analysts have suggested that
government bodies that are subject to open meeting laws tend to hold
fewer official meetings and to engage in less discussion of matters in
those meetings; officials depend more on their staff members because
open meeting laws do not cover conversations between officials and
their staff; and many decisions are made by notational voting (a system
under which matters are approved without a meeting through seriatim
consideration of decisional memoranda, a practice originally intended
for routine items but sometimes used for other matters). 62 Having
considered the anti-corruptive effects and First Amendment
implications of open meeting laws, this paper turns now to a discussion
of the relationship between term limits and corruption.
59. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978) (discussing how the

Supreme Court evaluates restrictions on speech related to subjects such as partisan politics).
60. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (describing the "strict scrutiny" review of laws that
"would suppress [political speech], whether by design or inadvertence").
61. David M. Welborn et al., The Federal Government in the Sunshine Act and Agency
Decision Making, 20 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 465, 482 (1989).
62. See, e.g., Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine
Act: Its Objectives, Goals and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 481-85

(1997) (evaluating the costs of the Sunshine Act); Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed
Minds: Another Road to the Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 11, 20-29 (2004) (explaining the
negative aspects of open meetings, drawing in part on the author's experience as a member of the
Federal Communications Commission); Welborn et al., supra note 61, at 471-75 (discussing the
perceived effects of the Sunshine Act).
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B. Term Limits

Term limits have been promoted as a way to reform government by
forcing turnover in office. Proponents contend that this will reduce or
eliminate careerism, bring more citizens into office who will return to
the private sector after a relatively short period of public service, and
promote more effective government. 63 The Supreme Court held that
states may not impose term limits on members of Congress, 64 but nearly
half the states adopted such measures for state legislators. 65
As with open meeting laws, studies of the impact of term limits have
not specifically addressed questions of corruption. Those studies, which
have focused on state legislatures and mostly in the first decade (or less)
of term limits, generally find that term limits are associated with
increased power for legislative staff and executive officials at the
expense of individual legislators and the legislature as a whole; less
individual expertise and shorter time horizons on the part of legislators;

63. See, e.g., JAMES K. COYNE & JOHN H. FUND, CLEANING HOUSE: AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN
FOR TERM LIMITS 10-12, 18-19, 120-24 (1992) (explaining that term limits work in many other

occupations and will attract many talented people to run for public office); Paul Jacob, From the
Voters with Care, in THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS 27, 29-38 (Edward H. Crane &

Roger Pilon eds., 1994) (discussing how term limits rejuvenate the election process and restore a
citizen legislature); Mark P. Petracca, Restoring "The University in Rotation": An Essay in
Defense of Term Limitation, in THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS, supra, at 57, 68, 73

(defending term limits on the grounds that they assure accountability in politics and prevent the
professionalization of legislative politics). See generally GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION:
CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1992) (arguing

that term limits can help restore respect and competence to Congress).
64. U.S. Terms Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995).
65. At present, fifteen states have term limits for state legislators. Between 1990 and 2000,
twenty-one states adopted such limits. State supreme courts invalidated four of those measures,

and two others have been repealed. No term limits for state legislators have been adopted since
2000. See Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, The Term Limited States, http://www.ncsl.org/
Default.aspx?Tabld=14844 (last updated June 2009) (listing states that currently have term limits
and those in which term limits have been repealed).
Term limits for local officials have fared inconsistently in the courts. Federal constitutional
challenges have failed. See, e.g., Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F. Supp. 587, 595 (W.D.
Tex. 1996) (members of city council); Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816, 822
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (members of city council), aff'd, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995). Several
challenges based on state law have succeeded. See, e.g., Allred v. McLoud, 31 S.W.3d 836, 839
(Ark. 2000) (invalidating locally adopted term limits for county officials); Polis v. City of La
Palma, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 325 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that state law preempted municipal
term-limit ordinance); Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 823 So. 2d 86, 94-95 (Fla. 2002) (holding
that local term limits violated the state constitution); Chi. Bar Ass'n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,
641 N.E.2d 525, 534 (Il.

1994) (per curiam) (finding improper a proposed constitutional

amendment limiting terms of state legislators); Minneapolis Term Limits Coal. v. Keefe, 535
N.W.2d 306, 309 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that term limits for city officials would violate state

constitution); Cottrell v. Santillanes, 901 P.2d 785, 789 (N.M. Ct. App.) (finding term limits for
members of city council inconsistent with state law), cert. denied,900 P.2d 962 (N.M. 1995).
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and reduced incentives for cooperation. 66 Evidence about the impact of
term limits in other respects is less negative but inconsistent. For
example, term-limited legislators apparently make more policy
proposals than do those in states without term limits, 67 but legislatures
in term-limits states tend to produce less innovative policies. 68
Similarly, the demographic composition of legislatures has not changed
much in states that have adopted term limits. 69
Whatever the impact of term limits on the quality of public policymaking, we lack reliable information about whether they can reduce or
prevent corruption. By requiring turnover in office, such limits might
reduce the power of officials that may tempt them into corrupt
arrangements. On the other hand, by shortening officials' time
horizons, term limits might make corruption or self-dealing more
attractive as officials would have to think about what to do when term
limits force them from office. Regardless, it seems unlikely that the
extent of term limits at the state level will change any time soon; no
new term limits have been adopted since 2000,70 and efforts to repeal or
modify term limits in the states that have them have generally failed.7 1
Thus, term limits are unlikely to be adopted on a sufficiently wide scale
to reduce political corruption even if they do in fact promote official
integrity.
II. PROSECUTION

If corruption cannot be prevented, it should be punished. Prosecuting
corrupt officials poses a variety of institutional challenges. At the state
level, for example, prosecutorial authority is often divided. The
66. See, e.g., JOHN M. CAREY ET AL., TERM LIMITS IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES 124-29
(2000) (studying the negative and positive effects of term limits); THAD KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS
AND THE DISMANTLING OF STATE LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM 205-12 (2005) (detailing the
advantages of legislative professionalism); MARJORIE SARBAUGH-THOMPSON ET AL., THE
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TERM LIMITS 185-98 (2004) (evaluating the goals
of term limits and whether or not they were achieved). For the views of a former state legislator
who initially supported term limits but now opposes them (apparently for reasons that do not
include a thwarted political career), see Robert W. Naylor, The Good and the Bad of Term Limits,
2 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y art. 8 (2010), availableat http://www.bepress.com/cjpp/vol2/issl/8 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2010).
67. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 66, at 124-25 (pointing out that newcomers in term-limit
states spend more time promoting their own legislation).
68. Id. at 124; KOUSSER, supra note 66, at 207.
69. CAREY ET AL., supra note 66, at 123-24; KOUSSER, supra note 66, at 205.
70. See Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 65 (listing states with term limits).
71. See Carol S. Weissen & Karen Halperin, The Paradox of Term Limit Support: To Know
Them Is NOT to Love Them, 60 POL. RES. Q. 516, 516 (2007) (detailing examples of states that
have tried to amend or eliminate term limits provisions and have failed).
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attorney general typically does not initiate criminal cases. That
authority usually rests with a local district attorney. At the federal level,
the attorney general might sign off on decisions to file corruption
charges, but the primary authority for prosecution rests with the U.S.
attorney for the district in which the charges are laid. Corruption cases
are, to put it mildly, politically sensitive. District attorneys might
hesitate to go after local officials with whom they have personal and
political relationships, and U.S. attorneys are not immune from political
pressure, as the controversy over the dismissal of several federal
prosecutors during the second term of President George W. Bush
attests. For these reasons, some special arrangements have been
devised to investigate and prosecute political corruption. This section
will discuss some of these special mechanisms at both federal and state
levels.
A. The Rise and Fall of the Independent Counsel

The Watergate scandal, which began when operatives of President
Nixon's reelection campaign were arrested for breaking into the
Democratic National Committee headquarters and ultimately implicated
officials close to Nixon and even the chief executive himself, led to the
appointment of a special prosecutor. The first special prosecutor,
Archibald Cox, was fired at President Nixon's direction. The ensuing
political firestorm led to the appointment of a second special prosecutor,
Leon Jaworski, who went to the Supreme Court to enforce a subpoena
leading to the release of crucial evidence that led to Nixon's
resignation. 72
The controversy over the firing of Cox as the first Watergate special
prosecutor led to the enactment of the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act. 73 The Supreme Court, over a
vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, upheld the constitutionality of the
independent counsel law in Morrison v. Olson.74 That law worked as
72. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 716 (1974). There is an enormous literature about
the Watergate scandal. For a well-regarded account by a prominent historian, see generally
STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE (1990).

73. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978) (amended 1983, renewed 1988,
expired 1992, reenacted 1994, expired 1999); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 527 (D.C. Cir.)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also KEN
GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE: CLINTON VS. STARR 95 (2010) (detailing

Kenneth Starr's role as a special prosecutor in the investigation of President Bill Clinton);
KUTLER, supra note 72, at 581-82 (describing the dismissal of Archibald Cox as special
prosecutor and the ensuing battle between President Nixon and Congress over the independence
of the special prosecutor).
74. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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follows: The Attorney General, on receipt of information suggesting
that the President, other high-ranking executive officials, or high-level
officials of the President's political campaign had committed a serious
federal crime, had up to ninety days to determine whether there were
"no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted." 75 Otherwise, the Attorney General was to inform a special
division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit of the situation. 7 6 The special division would then
appoint an independent counsel, who would exercise powers that
otherwise belonged to the Department of Justice.7 7 An independent
counsel could be removed from office only for cause and only by the
Attorney General. 78
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion rejected claims that the
independent counsel law violated the Appointments Clause, infringed
on presidential power, and ran afoul of general principles of separation
of powers. 79 First, the independent counsel could be appointed by the
special division because she was an inferior officer-the Appointments
Clause authorizes Congress to "vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments."80 This was because the
independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher-level executive
official (the Attorney General), exercised limited duties, and had limited
jurisdiction and tenure. 81 Moreover, there was no incongruity in vesting
the appointment in the special division, which was precluded from
hearing any matters brought by an independent counsel, as the statute
sought to avoid conflicts of interest in the executive branch, so
conferring the power on that court was entirely sensible. 82
Second, the removal procedure-under which the independent
counsel could be removed only by the Attorney General and only for
cause-was constitutionally permissible. 83 Congress did not reserve for
itself any role in removal and conferred that power on a high-level
executive official who was directly accountable to the President.8 4 The
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 660-61.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 696-97.
Id. at 672; U.S. CONST. art. n, § 2, cl. 2.
Morrison,487 U.S. at 671-72.
Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 686.
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cause requirement was also constitutionally permissible because it did
not "unduly trammel[] on executive authority."85
Third, the statute was consistent with the overall scheme of
separation of powers embodied in the Constitution. Congress had not
sought to aggrandize power for itself at the expense of the President; 86
the law did not permit the judiciary to exercise power that properly
belonged to the executive branch; 87 and it gave the executive enough
control over the independent counsel to permit the President to exercise
his constitutional duties.88
Justice Scalia strenuously dissented, lamenting what he characterized
as the demise of "our former constitutional system." 89 Detailed
consideration of his argument is beyond the scope of this paper. 90 Two
more recent decisions affecting Morrison's continuing vitality deserve
mention, however. Some language in Edmond v. United States9 1 might
raise questions about Morrison's analysis of the independent counsel's
status as an inferior officer. Edmond addressed the constitutionality of
the Secretary of Transportation's appointment of civilian members of
the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. In the course of
concluding that those persons were inferior officers, Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court, explaining that "the term 'inferior officer' connotes
a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the
President: Whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether he
has a superior." 92 As Justice Souter explained in his concurring
opinion, this analysis is not entirely consistent with Morrison's
approach to the question: in Morrison, the Court focused on factors
beyond whether the independent counsel had a nominal superior to
determine whether she was an inferior officer. 93
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 691.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.

88. Id. at 696.
89. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. For more detailed analysis of both opinions in Morrison, see, for example, Jonathan L.
Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO

ST. L.J. 175, 201-06 (1990) (summarizing and explicating the reasoning behind Morrison v.
Olson).

91. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
92. Id. at 662.
93. Id. at 667-68 (Souter, J., concurring). Some commentators have noted the apparent
tension between Morrison and Edmond. See, e.g., Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still
Good Law? The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103,

1107 (1998) (suggesting that Morrison's Appointments Clause holding is ripe for reconsideration
in light of Edmond); Andrew Croner, Essay, Morrison, Edmond, and the Power of Appointments,

77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1002, 1003 (2009) (arguing that the term "Officers of the United States"
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The recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board94 used the Edmond analysis to uphold a

key provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 9 5 that created a new agency
(the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) to register
accounting firms, establish substantive and ethical accounting standards,
and investigate registered accounting firms. Members of the Board are
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in consultation
with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
and the Secretary of the Treasury. 96 The Court had "no hesitation"
about concluding that, "under Edmond," these officials "are inferior
officers" and that their appointment by the SEC was constitutionally
permissible. 97
The Edmond approach, endorsed in Free Enterprise Fund, might

imply that the Court would find a violation of the Appointments Clause
in the independent counsel law if Morrison had arisen today rather than
a quarter-century ago. This approach suggests that the independent
counsel might not be an inferior officer for lack of a sufficiently close
relationship with high executive branch officials. The Free Enterprise
Fund Court had no occasion to address this question, but that case
probably will not be the last word on the subject. Chief Justice Roberts
explained in the second paragraph of the majority opinion that "[t]he
parties d[id] not ask us to reexamine" Morrison, so the Court "d[id] not
do so." 98 This statement does not preclude a subsequent effort to
overrule Morrison. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in the court of
appeals invited the Supreme Court to revisit the independent counsel
ruling in Free EnterpriseFund.9 9

In a very important sense, Morrison's continuing vitality does not
matter very much.
The independent counsel law was often
is a term intended to have substantive meaning).
94. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219 (2006).
96. Id. § 7211(e)(4)(A).
97. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162. Justice Breyer, who dissented from the Court's
holding that the statutory restrictions on the SEC's power to remove Board members violated the
Constitution and therefore had to be excised, agreed with the majority's analysis of the Board
members' status as inferior officers. Id. at 3164 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 3147 (majority opinion).
99. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 696-97 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that Morrison and Humphrey's Executor v. United

States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), on which Morrison partially relied, "have long been criticized by
many as inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, with the understanding of the text that
largely prevailed from 1789 through 1935, and with prior precedents" but adding that "we cannot,
need not, and do not relitigate those two cases here" because, "[flor this [lower] Court, those
cases are binding precedents"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
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controversial. To finesse objections, the law contained a sunset
provision that required its periodic reauthorization. After being
reauthorized in 1983 and 1988, it lapsed in 1992 but was reauthorized in
1994 as the Whitewater scandal broke around President Clinton.
Kenneth Starr was appointed independent counsel, and the storm over
his performance led to the law's almost completely unlamented
expiration in 1999.100 It seems extremely unlikely that this or any
similar statute will have sufficient political support to be enacted in the
foreseeable future. The political demise of the independent counsel law
suggests the difficulty of crafting special institutions to deal with
political corruption and raises the question whether traditional
arrangements in the Department of Justice and at the state and local
level, as imperfect as they might be, could be at least as effective as
innovations that turn out badly in practice.
B. The Limits of State Ethics Commissions

Meanwhile, a number of states have created special procedures for
handling allegations of official misconduct. Among these are ethics
commissions charged with enforcing conflict of interest rules to reduce
the risk of corruption. Two recent judicial rulings that took a restrictive
view of the authority of ethics commissions suggest the limitations of
this approach to dealing with corruption.
In Commission on Ethics v. Hardy,'0 the Nevada Supreme Court

held that the ethics commission lacked constitutional authority to
investigate allegations that a state senator violated the conflict of
interest law by voting for legislation that benefited members of a
building contractors' association of which he served as president and
not disclosing the connection between the bill and its effect on the
group's members. 102 The court first noted that the Nevada Constitution
explicitly forbids any branch of state government from "exercis[ing]
any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases
expressly directed or permitted in this constitution." 103 Of particular
significance, the state constitution gives the legislature the power to

100. See GORMLEY, supra note 73, at 95-96, 655-56 (pointing out that Kenneth Starr's
prosecutorial overzealousness and lack of self restraint buried the independent counsel law);
KUTLER, supra note 72, at 582-84 (describing practical and constitutional criticisms of the
independent prosecutor prior to Morrison v. Olson); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND
BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 170-71 (rev. 10th ed. 2003).
101. 212 P.3d 1098 (Nev. 2009) (per curiam).
102. Id.atlloo-01&n.l.
103. Id. at 1104 (quoting NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1(1)).
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discipline its members for "disorderly conduct."1 04 This power to
discipline members may not be delegated. 0 5 Any investigation or
discipline related to a member's core legislative function of voting on
bills, therefore, must be undertaken by the legislature itself. Because
any disclosure of conflicts of interest in connection with pending bills
relates to this core function, only that branch may discipline a member
for failure to disclose. 106 As an executive agency, the ethics
commission could not take any action in connection with the senator's
voting on the bill about which he had a conflict of interest. 107
Some of the language in the Nevada court's opinion seems to suggest
that an expansive definition of "disorderly conduct" could preclude the
prosecution of a legislator for soliciting or accepting a bribe in
connection with her vote. After all, the attorney general or the district
attorney who might investigate and try any bribery charge exercises
executive power. On this view, allowing a criminal case to go forward
would undermine the express protection of separation of powers in the
state constitution. We should hesitate to read the case so broadly,
however, because the court did not discuss or even hint at this
possibility. Nor did the court allude to the definition of disorderly
conduct except to observe that violations of conflict of interest rules
represented a species of disorderly conduct. The other recent case
reached a similar conclusion but on narrower grounds that rules out the
potential immunity for a legislator who seeks or accepts a bribe in
connection with a vote on a bill.
Just a month before the Nevada ruling, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, in Irons v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission,10 8 held that

legislative immunity protected a former president of the state senate
from prosecution on charges that he had voted against a proposal to
allow consumers to choose where to have their prescriptions filled when
he privately represented a major pharmacy retailer and a leading health
insurance company that would be affected by the proposal. 109 The
decision relied on the Speech in Debate Clause of the state
constitution. 10 Invoking earlier decisions that construed this provision
expansively, the court emphasized that the legislative privilege was "a
104. Id. (quoting NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6).
105. Id. at 1105.
106. Id. at 1106-07.
107. Id. at 1108.
108. 973 A.2d 1124 (R.I. 2009).
109. Id. at 1134.
110. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 5 ("For any speech in debate in either house, no member shall be
questioned in any other place.").
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venerable and important product of historical travails in England" that
"was most definitely embraced by this country" following the
Revolution and was expressly reaffirmed when the voters had ratified a
revision of the state constitution in 1986.111 The privilege protects the
people by allowing their representatives to do their work without
improper interference from the executive and judicial branches. 112
Moreover, a constitutional amendment establishing the ethics
commission did not supersede legislative immunity because there was
no evidence that the amendment "was intended to abrogate speech-indebate immunity."113 Because this amendment was approved by the
voters at the same time that they endorsed a general revision of the rest
of the constitution that was not intended to have substantive
significance and the amendment did not explicitly suggest any
limitation of legislative immunity, the expansive reading of the Speech
in Debate Clause remained appropriate. 14
Despite its broad construction of this provision, the court emphasized
that the immunity was not absolute. The opinion explicitly remarked
that the Speech in Debate Clause did not protect legislators from
prosecution for "solicitation and acceptance of bribes" as well as for
other "criminal activities, even those committed to further legislative
activity."1 15 In support of this observation, the Rhode Island court
invoked cases construing the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which contains language that is functionally identical to
the state provision. 116 A careful reading of those cases should lead to
some qualification of the broad language in the Irons opinion.
Although it is accurate to say that members of Congress may be
prosecuted for soliciting or accepting bribes, only certain kinds of
evidence may be used to prove the crime. In United States v.
Brewster,117 the Supreme Court held that a former Senator could be
prosecuted for seeking and taking payments in exchange for votes on
postal rate legislation."l 8 The Court reasoned that "the Speech or
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry only into those things generally said or
done in the House or the Senate in the performance of official duties
111.

Irons, 973 A.2d at 1130.

112. Id. at 1131.
113. Id. at 1133.
114. Id. at 1134.
115. Id. at 1131.

116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I ("[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
117. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
118. Id. at 528-29.
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and into the motivation for those acts."ll 9 In this instance, the
government had to prove only that Brewster sought and accepted the
bribes; the prosecutor did not have to establish that the Senator
performed any legislative act in conformity with his promise. 120 This
point was underscored in United States v. Helstoski,12 1 which held that

the government could not use evidence of past legislative actions by a
member of Congress in a bribery prosecution.122 Helstoski, a former
Representative, was indicted for taking money to introduce private bills
to suspend deportation orders against immigrants who wanted to remain
in this country.123 Although the Speech or Debate Clause precluded the
introduction of evidence of past legislative actions, which undoubtedly
would make bribery cases more difficult to prove,1 24 the prosecution
was free to use evidence of promises to perform future acts in exchange
for illicit payments.125
In short, constitutional protections for legislators might complicate
the process of forcing those officials who engage in bribery-probably
the quintessential form of personal corruption-to account for their
misdeeds. Keep in mind, however, that Hardy and Irons involved
claims of conflict of interest-another form of conduct that promotes
private gain at the expense of the public interest. Although the analysis
of the Nevada and Rhode Island courts differed in certain respects, both
cases suggest that only legislative bodies may enforce conflict of
interest rules against their members. Of course, legislators are not the
only officials who engage in corruption, but the prospects for vigorous
enforcement of conflict of interest rules by legislatures against their
own members do not seem very promising, at least if the pace of recent
congressional investigations is any indication. 126
119. Id. at 512.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 526.
442 U.S. 477 (1979).
Id. at 494.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 487-88.

125. Id. at 489.
126. See, e.g., Erich Lichtblau, Congressional Ethics Inquiries Drag On, Despite Vows to End

Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at A21 (explaining how Congress has struggled to police
itself even when its ethics committees were labeled as ineffectual). Recently, nearly two dozen
House members co-sponsored a resolution to prevent the new Office of Congressional Ethics
from initiating investigations without a sworn complaint from someone with personal knowledge
of alleged wrongdoing and from releasing public statements about complaints for which it
recommends dismissal. The resolution has drawn criticism from those who believe that these
changes would make it more difficult to promote higher standards of conduct in Congress. See
Eric Lipton, 20 in Black Caucus Ask for Curbs on Ethics Office, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at

A17 (explaining the details of the proposed legislation and its drawbacks); Fudge Factor; A
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III. CONCLUSION

Readers who have persevered to this point should not take these
comments as a sign of despair. The task of preventing and punishing
corruption presents daunting challenges, but we should put those
challenges into perspective. I want to conclude with a seemingly
paradoxical observation: corruption, at least to some extent, might
actually serve some socially useful functions.
Earlier I quoted Madison's recognition of the fallibility of
humanity. 127 More than a decade before Madison wrote, a member of
the Continental Congress warned: "It is prudent not to put Virtue to too
serious a Test. I would use American Virtue, as sparingly as possible
lest We wear it out."128 Both of these views take certain forms of
behavior as all too common and therefore undesirable. Of course, crime
and corruption fit into that category. But can they be eliminated?
Should they be eradicated?
Most lawyers, indeed most people, believe that the answer to those
questions is indubitably yes. Emile Durkheim, the great French
sociologist, suggested a more nuanced response. Durkheim argued that
crime occurs in all societies and that it is simultaneously "an inevitable
though regrettable phenomenon" and "an integrative element in any
healthy society."' 29 Crime elicits widespread indignation and reinforces
social norms about appropriate behavior. "From all the similar
impressions exchanged and all the different expressions of wrath there
rises up a single fount of anger, more or less clear-cut according to the
particular case, anger which is that of everybody without being that of
anybody in particular. It is public anger." 130
If Durkheim is correct, we should regard a certain degree of
corruption as inevitable. This does not mean, it bears emphasis, that we
should treat corruption as appropriate. Instead, we should recognize
that corruption harms the body politic and that it offends our sense of
Proposalby Rep. Marcia Fudge Would Gut the New CongressionalEthics Office, WASH. POST,
June 4, 2010, at A18 (detailing the contents of the Fudge resolution).
127. See supra text accompanying note 12 ("If men were angels, no government would be
necessary.").
128. John Adams, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress (Oct. 5, 1775), in 2 DIARY
AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 192, 193 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961). The
speaker, John Joachim Zubly, was referring to the need for international trade, but the quotation
has been used for broader purposes. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 95 (1969) (stating the doubts Americans had of the suitability of
republicanism for their society circa 1775).
129. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 98 (Steven Lukes ed. &
W.D. Halls trans., 1982).
130. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR INSOCIETY 58 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984).
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propriety, morality, and integrity. The fight against corruption, in other
words, helps us gain "mutual assurance that [we] are still in unison."1 31
Corruption, by reminding us of our common interests and dominant
values, helps us define and reinforce who we are as a society. 132 But it
can do so only if we continue to regard corruption as legally and
morally unacceptable so that we can do our best to minimize the
phenomenon. Our institutions that seek to combat corruption are
imperfect, but imperfection does not mean that the battle against
corruption is a failure. Perhaps we can design better institutions, but
failure will come only when we see corruption exclusively as normal.

13 1. Id.
132.

See KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE

4 (1966) (arguing that crime may actually draw people together in a common posture of anger
and indignation, therefore developing a tighter bond of solidarity than previously existed).

